

DISPATCH		CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	PROCESSING ACTION	
TO	Chief, EUR			MARKED FOR INDEXING
INFO.	Chief of Station, Germany			NO INDEXING REQUIRED
FROM	A/Chief, Munich Liaison Base			ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
SUBJECT	CATUSK UJRANDOM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Debriefing Results and Details			MICROFILM Z P
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES				
ACTION: Approval of Trip by Alias BERNHARDT to Headquarters to Discuss <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Material				
<p>1. @BERNHARDT of CATUSK Security has recently informed us that they are not at all satisfied that UJDROWSY was the only penetration of CATUSK and that now that some of the dust around the UJDROWSY affair has settled, they would like to follow up some of its leads they had before the UJDROWSY affair broke. In that connection @BERNHARDT mentioned the 1957 compromise of the information concerning the so-called mutual Assistance program which was discussed in 1956 between MLB and CATUSK in preparation of the contemplated visit of UTILITY to ASCHAM. After careful research it is evident to CATUSK that:</p> <p>A. Some of the material was most definitely compromised,</p> <p>B. That neither UJDROWSY nor anyone in his vicinity ever had access to the material.</p> <p>These revelations alone would clearly indicate that there must have been another penetration at this time close to UTILITY's office. None of the persons so far investigated under the UJRANDOM program meet these requirements.</p>				
<p>Distribution:</p> <p>2-EUR 2-Germany</p> <p style="text-align: center;">GROUP I EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION</p> <p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2005</p> <p style="text-align: center;">MICROFILMED MAY 18 1967 DOC. MICRO. SER.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">10 MAY 1967</p> <p style="text-align: center;">CS COPY</p>				
CROSS REFERENCE TO		DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D 32W-5-38/18		EGMA-70340	4 May 1967	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D 32W-5-38/19		CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D 32W-2-33/1		S E C R E T		

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. EGMA-70340
<p>2. In that connection @BERNHARDT recalls a statement by [] that two officers on the UJDRACO VII trip were penetrations. Although it has been generally assumed that @RISCHKE was the second officer, @BERNHARDT is not fully satisfied that @RISCHKE was meant. He has, of course, no illusions about @RISCHKE's bona fides. For that matter, @RISCHKE has been terminated, basically because of his involvement in security matters. But @BERNHARDT feels that that would be too easy a solution and it certainly does not account for the compromise cited in paragraph one above as @RISCHKE had no more access to the material than UJDROWSY. []</p> <p>3. One of the questions @BERNHARDT poses today is: Did [] have information only on joint WOFAC/CATUSK matters or had he also information concerning only CATUSK. If [] had information on CATUSK unilateral operations they have not come to the attention of @BERNHARDT. @BERNHARDT notes that in the interrogation and debriefing of [] there are often cryptic references to material previously discussed by the debriefer with [] with which both are familiar, which however, is not clear to the uninitiated.</p> <p>4. @BERNHARDT is of the opinion that the most effective way for him to follow up his leads and close the gaps in his knowledge would be to visit Headquarters, listen again to the tapes and discuss his problems with the previous debriefers, especially [] @BERNHARDT is most interested in getting his further investigation off the ground soon and would greatly appreciate an expression from WOFAC as to his welcome to discuss these matters and, if so, when his presence would be most productive.</p> <p>[]</p> <p>APPROVED: []</p> <p>[]</p>		
FORM 53c 5-60 (40)	CLASSIFICATION S E C R E T	<input type="checkbox"/> CONTINUED PAGE NO. 2